Iraq’s Chief Export

John Manetta Once Told Me


May 2, 2007
By Bill McMorris

There are very few terms that intimidate the Democratic party more than the phrase “global war on terror.” Democrats in the House Armed Services Committee were so were so petrified of the slogan that they “banished” it from the 2008 defense budget last month. In doing so, the Democrats have affirmed their belief that the War in Iraq has no ties to the struggle against Islamofascist terrorist organizations worldwide.

Armed services committee chairman Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), and his colleagues have maintained that the War in Iraq hinders U.S. capabilities in the war against terrorist organizations; prominent al-Qaeda leaders like Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Musab Zarqawi might disagree.

John Edwards and Joe Biden, along with two other candidates, made the Democratic position clear when they dismissed the idea of a “global war on terror” at the Democratic presidential debate last Thursday.

The debate came just a day before al-Hadi was transferred to Guantanamo Bay’s detention center. Al-Hadi, a former officer in Saddam Hussein’s army, masterminded al-Qaeda’s attacks in London, which claimed the lives of 52 British commuters in July 2005.

This “high value detainee” elected to fight for al-Qaeda in Iraq, rather than enlist in the Sunni insurgency. This is because al-Hadi believed that the conflict in Iraq pitted Islam against the West, rather than Sunni against Shiite. Thus, al-Hadi’s war-making efforts became focused on Britain, rather than Baghdad.

Radical British Muslims flocked to al-Qaeda training camps in Pakistan during the onset of the Global War on Terror. These youths dreamed of becoming mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan or Iraq. Al-Hadi, however, had other plans. Insurgent hopefuls were transformed into suicide bombers. Al-Hadi then exported these murderous thugs back to their home countries to continue the holy war against Europe. Five of these “holy warriors” were sentenced to life in prison on Monday for plots to attack a wide array of targets, including nightclubs, power plants and malls. All five were in contact with 7/7 bomber Mohammed Siddique Khan, who received explosives training in Pakistan in 2004 before being “deployed” into Great Britain.

Al-Hadi’s efforts were not limited to training suicide bombers in Pakistan. He is also credited with forming al-Qaeda’s alliance with the Iraqi insurgency. Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman explained that at the time of his capture, “Abd al-Hadi was trying to return to his native country, Iraq, to manage al-Qaeda’s affairs and possibly focus on operations outside Iraq against Western targets.” The loss of al-Hadi has certainly dealt a blow to the Iraqi insurgency, as well as international terrorism.

The alliance between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgency, which al-Hadi had crafted, is beginning to falter. al-Masri, the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, was killed on Monday, according to the Iraqi interior ministry. Al-Masri assumed the position following the death of al-Zarqawi last year. Unlike Zarqawi, al-Masri was killed by fellow insurgents, rather than coalition forces. His death was attributed to “score settling with al-Qaeda.”

Al-Masri has been credited with kidnapping and murdering two U.S. soldiers just south of Baghdad last year. The “two crusaders taken hostage” by al-Masri were found dead; their bodies exhibited signs of “brutal torture.” Al-Masri’s brutality, however, had reached a level that was unacceptable to sectarian fighters in Iraq.

Al-Masri’s tactics were killing an intolerable amount of Iraqi civilians; believe me, it takes a good deal of dead Iraqi civilians to anger the Iraqi insurgency. Analysts have begun to observe “growing friction between Sunni Islamist al Qaeda and other Sunni Arab insurgent groups over al Qaeda’s indiscriminate killing of civilians.” In fact, the past year has seen “a coalition of powerful Sunni tribes from the western province of Anbar … once sympathetic to [al-Qaeda’s] cause has thrown its lot in with the Americans.” The growing antagonism of al-Qaeda is now backfiring. This trend, however, is not exactly the “change of course” that Senate Majority leader Harry Reid had in mind.

While al-Hadi was exporting suicide bombers to Europe, Iran began to send their trainees into Iraq to assist insurgents like al-Masri. On the day that al-Hadi was transferred to Gitmo, four other Iraqi insurgents were captured smuggling armor piercing EFP explosives through the Iranian border. EFPs have been credited with killing “at least 170 U.S. troops since May 2004.”

Intelligence officials consider the design of such explosives to be “exclusively Iranian.” It is believed that these four insurgents were charged with not only delivering the smuggled roadside bombs, but also with sending other militants back over the border to receive training. Iran, like al-Qaeda, is exporting terrorists and insurgents with similar training and shared targets.

These deadly explosives were intended to supply radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia. The Iranian contribution to the Iraqi insurgency, however, pays no attention to sectarian lines. Iran is not motivated by notions of Shiite victory over Sunni. It is no coincidence that al-Hadi and al-Masri both entered Iraq through the Iranian border. Iran affords safe passage to Sunni and Shiite terrorists alike. Abu Ayyub al-Masri was able to cross the borders, despite his attacks on Shiite holy sites, including the car bomb that devastated a Shiite shrine in Samarra.

Much like their colleagues in al-Qaeda, Iran’s goal in Iraq is a coalition defeat. President Bush thankfully prevented this yesterday when he vetoed a House bill that proposed “deadlines” to the war. It is impossible to create a short term deadline when one is engaged in an ideological conflict that spans the globe.

The War in Iraq represents much more than a war in Iraq. It is part of an international struggle to defeat a hateful ideology that employs ruthless tactics to achieve its goals. Democratic nominees say that they can better handle foreign affairs; but how can one be trusted with our nation’s security when he or she do not even understand the threat that they are addressing?

Billy McMorris is a junior in the College of Arts and Sciences. He can be reached at wjm27@cornell.edu. John Manetta Once Told Me appears alternate Wednesdays.